INTRODUCTION
This paper starts with a brief description of the office of the State AGs. In contrast to the competition authorities in Europe, which are generally administrative in nature and specialise in the enforcement of the competition rules, the State AGs are political in their nature, and they pursue a much more comprehensive agenda.
Afterwards, the paper analyses the doctrine of parens patriae in its historical structure, which is the main source of authority of the State AGs in enforcement of federal antitrust law. It is emphasised that the doctrine has experienced substantial transformation over time, as it has evolved to a source of deterrence and redress, whereas it used to be a mechanism of federalism.
Then, putting it into the context of antitrust, the paper discusses features of modern antitrust enforcement through parens patriae actions. The strengths of the parens patriae mechanism, compared to class actions, methods of damage distribution, degree of control exercised by the courts, and limitations of parens patriae actions, particularly the position of indirect purchasers in federal law, constitute the main subjects of discussion. Throughout the section it is underlined that although using private enforcement methods, State AGs enforce federal antitrust laws for public purposes, hence, they have been given considerable discretion to direct their enforcement efforts. Eventually the paper discusses the proposals of the Antitrust Modernization Commission to enhance the effectiveness of current enforcement structure. In addition to the proposals addressing state enforcement directly, proposals on indirect purchasers are also discussed, albeit only in terms of their possible impacts on state enforcement. The Antitrust Modernization Commission is criticised for going to the extreme in the lack of any convincing empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of state enforcement. Besides, the position of the Commission seems to be inconsistent as it proposes to restrict parens patriae authority on the one hand, and to level the playing field on the other in the context of actions by indirect purchasers for treble damages. The paper proposes an alternative solution; one of improved judicial scrutiny through adoption of a judicial review standard tailored to the dynamics of parens patriae actions with a special emphasis on conflicts between the state and federal enforcers.
I. STATE ATTORNEYS' POSITION, POWERS and DUTIES IN GENERAL
The history of the State AGs traces back to colonial times where attorneys were appointed by the King of England to perform the function of the Attorney General of England in the colonies; that is, to represent the interests of the crown in every venue including the judiciary and the legislature.
1 During the such as the conflicts between different administrative units which occur when they perform their duties, as well as to high policy issues such as the legislative action to be taken to deal with a particular political problem. There is a consensus in the literature that legal advice of the State AGs is generally taken into consideration under ordinary circumstances. 10 At times, legal opinion of the state AGs, especially those regarding conflicts between administrative units, may even set the only official interpretation on a particular legal question -as those matters generally remain unlitigated -and influence the stance of the state courts in subsequent cases. 11 In some states, the AGs are also given the authority to mediate conflicts between administrative and political units, and as a result they get involved in the administrative politics more frequently. 12 Besides, in most states, either because they are given that duty specifically by the state law or because it is found inappropriate to ignore the complaints of the citizens, particularly when it is considered that they are appointed by popular vote, they function as a kind of ombudsman in mediation of the conflicts between the citizens and the state executive or administrative units.
13
The office of the State AG has a very high burden of litigation involving both state and federal law. Therefore, some define the office as the "largest public benefit law firm of the state". 14 The office of the State AG gets involved in litigations when the benefits of the state and/or her citizens are at stake. First of all, they are generally required to interfere with the litigations both in the state and federal courts when a political or administrative division of the state or a state official is a party to the suit 15 . Second, they pursue litigation to protect the wellbeing of their citizens before the federal and state courts. 16 In general, this function stems from and had been developed through the application of the 'parens patriae' doctrine which is analysed in detail in the following section. The litigation burden of the office of State AG has greatly increased since the 1970s to include new domains such as antitrust, 10 Christenson, id., at 309. 11 Christenson, id., at 327-28. 12 Id., at 333. 13 Id., at 336. 14 Id., at 300, Thornburg, supra note 1, at 362. 15 Christenson, id., at 306; Thornburg, id., at 347; Matheson, Jr., supra note 1, at 3. 16 Christenson, id., at 311; Thornburg, id., at 347; Matheson, Jr., id., at 3.
consumer protection, environmental protection and public nuisance as a result of the increasing value given to those policies both by the state and federal levels 17 . The litigation function of the State AGs largely includes civil matters, as in most of the states criminal enforcement is exclusively the duty of the District Attorneys. Nevertheless, there are some states where direct involvement of the State AG is required in criminal matters, and in some others they affect the criminal proceedings and ultimately criminal policy through their supervisory powers on the District Attorneys.
18
The State AGs' administrative duties and powers differ from state to state. For instance, where regulated, the office of the State AG has the power to set the rates for utilities. 19 In general however, the administrative duties largely include those related to law enforcement functions.
Not surprisingly, the State AGs' powers and duties are not strictly restricted to those specifically prescribed by the state constitutions and legislations. As they have their genesis back in the English common law, so do their powers according to the stare decisis in most states. Although it is generally acknowledged that the State AGs possess the powers granted by the common law besides those recognised by the modern American federal and state law, the degree and authority of such power differs from state to state.
20
The general tendency is "to prevent any overlapping of powers in the absence of any definitive legislative grant of concurrent power". 21 Thus, generally the State AGs enjoy those powers stemming from common law as long as those powers are not granted to any other authority or prohibited to the State AG explicitly by the state law. However, extreme examples also exist, such as Illinois, where the legislative is hindered in taking away the common law powers of the State AG, 22 and Washington, where common law powers are not recognised at all. 23 Parens patriae authority of the State AGs constitute the most famous one among the common law authorities both in terms of doctrinal interest and practical policy enforcement purposes.
In summary, the State AGs possess a unique position within the political structure of the state. Besides being the chief law enforcers in their state, they also enjoy powers which give them the ability to influence the making of the state policies. They shoulder a litigation burden, including but not solely consisting of, antitrust law. Hence, both for organic and functional purposes, 2) Administrative Services Division: This division gives administrative support to the office.
3) Capital Litigation Division:
This division represents the State in all appeals in state and federal courts in which a criminal defendant has received a death sentence.
11) Investigations Division:
The Division investigates public corruption and white-collar crime cases as well as violent crimes and drug cases.
12) Law Enforcement Unit:
This unit coordinates annual state-wide law enforcement training on constitutional and criminal procedures, reviews and answers most constituent complaints lodged against local and county law enforcement agencies, on the behalf of the Attorney General, provides assistance to law enforcement agencies upon request and attends law enforcement conferences and association meetings on the behalf of the Attorney General's office, to stay abreast of issues affecting law enforcement.
4) Constitutional Defence Division:
This division defends the State in federal and state courts where a constitutional question is raised.
5) Consumer Affairs Division:
Provides protection to the consumers by serving as a mediator in consumer complaints, investigating the allegations of fraud or any other illegal activity by the business and offering information to the consumers.
6) Criminal Appeals Division:
As the largest division of the office it represents the State in all criminal cases not involving death sentence.
7) Environmental Division:
This division investigates complaints involving pollution, illegal hazardous waste, and other dangerous environmental concerns. Its lawyers file either a civil complaint or prosecute criminally. Environmental lawyers also develop proposed environmental regulation and legislation.
8) Executive Division:
The Executive Division houses the executive staff, including the Attorney General. The Chief Deputy Attorney General oversees all legal staff for the Office and keeps abreast of the day-to-day legal matters.
9) Family Protection Unit:
Consisting of the Child Abuse and Exploitation, Elder Abuse and Exploitation, Consumer Fraud, and Welfare Fraud departments, the Family Protection Unit takes civil and criminal action in collaboration with other state organisations to provide a healthy family environment to the citizens.
10) General Civil and Administrative Law Division:
This division represents the State in civil actions in all courts both as the plaintiff and the defender in matters including prisoner litigation, administrative hearings, contacts and commercial transactions. The Civil Division also encompasses the Utilities and the Consumer Affairs Sections.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE
The State AGs are given the authority to enforce the federal antitrust policy by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) which recognises their position of 'parens patriae'. The doctrine of parens patriae has remarkable historical roots and has experienced substantial transformation to serve different purposes before being utilised as an enforcement mechanism within the modern antitrust structure. At first the
16) Southern Environmental Enforcement Network:
The Network is a regional alliance of forty-five agencies from eleven Southern states. The Network was created by the participating states to support the effective enforcement of environmental laws, with an emphasis on criminal enforcement.
17) Victim Assistance Division:
The division provides state-wide assistance to victims of violent crime.
18) Violent Crimes Division:
The division consists of prosecutors represent the State in the investigation and prosecution of violent crimes, especially murder and rape, throughout the State.
15) Public Corruption and White Collar Crime Division:
The division comprises of prosecutors specially trained in the prosecution of public corruption, election fraud, bid-rigging, complex economic crimes, and ethics code violations. This division also assists the Alabama Securities Commission and the Judicial Inquiry Commission in their prosecutions.
14)
Medicaid Fraud/Welfare Fraud Division: The Unit is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of allegations of fraud and abuse by healthcare providers against the Alabama Medicaid Agency.
13)
The Opinions Division: Through the division the Attorney General, upon written request, furnishes written opinions on questions of law to the Governor, the other constitutional officers, the heads of state departments, agencies, boards and commissions, the members of the Legislature, and thousands of other local public officials and political subdivisions.
Supreme Court borrowed the concept from English common law to reinforce the federal vision, and then Congress discovered its utility as a source of extra deterrence to antitrust violations, and redress for the injured consumers.
A. Parens Patriae in Common Law
Literally, parens patriae means "the father of the country", and in its roots it refers to the Prerogative Regis or the royal prerogative of the King of England as the guardian of his people. 25 In common law, the King was deemed to be "personally sovereign" and to have "pre-eminence over all within the realm".
26
Specifically, however, due to his position as parens patriae, the King had become the guardian of those who are not able to protect their own interests, as he was believed to be "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics", and "the superintended of all charitable uses in the Kingdom". 27 Due to his position as parens patriae, the King was empowered to control legal and real persons falling under any one of these categories and to take them under his custody.
28

B. Supreme Courts Federal Vision: Early American Roots of Parens
Patriae
Although adopting the concept from common law and sticking to the consideration that one has the prerogative to sustain the well-being of those under his sovereignty, the American vision of parens patriae has developed to accomplish largely distinct aims and over broader categories of subject It was exactly the economic element of the concept of well-being which led to the expansion of the parens patriae doctrine to the domain of antitrust.
However, the motivations behind the early antitrust cases still happened to be far away from the objectives of modern antitrust philosophy. First of all, those cases were brought against the harm caused to the economy of the state in general as a result of antitrust violations, and the consumers were not even mentioned. Second, the rationale of the Court when granting the remedies was neither deterrence against conspiracies nor redress to the customers, but the requirements of the federal union.
Perhaps it is more than apparent in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 45 which was brought against a price-fixing conspiracy among the railroad companies, and as a result of which travel rates in Georgia had become considerably higher than in other states. When accepting the case the Court reasoned that:
'Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong, which if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister States. These are matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected. Georgia's interest is not remote, it is immediate.'
46
As a result, the interest which the Court aimed to protect was not one of customers who were forced to pay higher prices for their train journeys, but it was the interest of the state herself, or even the federation, in the prevention of trade barriers caused by price-fixing and price discrimination which deemed harmful to the prosperity and the welfare of the nation. 47 Although the reasoning does not seem completely appropriate under modern antitrust philosophy, Georgia still deserves some merit as it was the first case where injunction was granted against an antitrust violation under the doctrine of parens patriae. As another interesting aspect, Georgia was the first case where compensation is sought solely on parens patriae grounds, which unfortunately was rejected on procedural grounds without substantive analysis. In other words, as the consumers themselves were able to recover the damages they have suffered, there was no quasi-sovereign interest for the part of the State, and as a result, the State lacked standing to sue for damages under the doctrine of parens patriae.
Nearly two decades after Hawaii, states attempted to obtain damages by utilising the doctrine of parens patriae for the second time. . In this second attempt, California did not claim redress for its economy, rather, it was explicitly consumers on whose behalf compensation was sought. Therefore, the federal courts for the first time faced the question 'whether a state, as parens patriae, may sue and recover treble damages on behalf of its citizen-consumers for the injuries suffered by them'. 54 The Court of Appeals observed that this question was quite different from that presented in Hawaii, where damages had been sought for the injury to the general economy of the state. 55 As the existence of a quasi-sovereign interest independent of the citizens had been the strongest pillar of the American parens patriae tradition, the Court reasoned that awarding damages 'would be a substantial departure' from the stare decisis. Put simply, parens patriae as a concept developed solely for the purposes of federalism was neither a suitable device to be stretched to satisfy the objectives of consumer redress nor a clever enough political tool to overcome many problems likely to be brought by the usage of private enforcement mechanisms by the states for public purposes. Therefore, political action by the legislature was necessary to consider the appropriateness of the end which California sought. Congress responded quickly.
D. Modern Parens Patriae: the HSR Act
After almost two centuries since the passage of the American constitution Congress was considering changing the structure of federal antitrust enforcement substantially through adoption of a large package which inter alia proposed involvement of the State AGs to the federal picture as parens patriae. This time the main motivation behind the utilisation of the concept was not concerns of federalism or unity, however. Rather, evidence suggests that the legislature was more concerned about the effectiveness of the federal antitrust enforcement.
First of all, the bill coincided to a time where there was considerable criticism about the success of enforcement activities of the federal agencies in detecting and punishing violations effectively. 59 Second, there was also serious concern about the functioning of private enforcement mechanisms, and particularly whether they had accomplished the goal of providing redress to consumers injured by the antitrust violations. According to the House of Representatives, the answer to this question was negative:
'The aggregate loss to "thousands or even millions of consumers"
forced by antitrust conspiracies to pay excessive prices was presumed to be large, but the injury caused to any individual consumer was likely to be fairly small, even after trebling. Therefore, the Committee concluded that consumers were likely to have been After all, class actions as a general mechanism to provide compensation to the members of a mass who suffer from the same wrong had been recognised and applied within the context of antitrust long before the passage of the HSR Act. 65 Besides, in a number of occasions the courts had appointed the State AGs as the class representatives. 66 Therefore, there was already an alternative mechanism to provide compensation to the consumers who were unlikely to pursue litigation individually. However, class actions do not constitute a perfect substitute to the parens patriae actions due to the strict procedural conditions required by the federal law, and significant principalagent problems involved.
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In class actions federal courts are required to address three questions consecutively: first, whether the group can be certified as a class; second, whether the liability of the defendant and the amount of damages is proven;
and third, how the compensation will be distributed. In all stages there are strong procedural hurdles to be cleared. Appeals the District Court adopted the method of 'fluid recovery'. This method suggested creation of a fund equivalent to the amount of unclaimed damages through reducing the price of odd-lots in a portion approved by the Court until the fund is depleted. 78 As a result, the fund would benefit future odd-lot traders rather than the traders individually injured by the conspiracy. 79 The
Court of Appeals rejected this proposition on due process grounds, and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment without commenting on this issue. In parens patriae actions, on the other hand, there is no formal certification phase. Although it is required that consumers on whose behalf the case was brought should be given notice for due process concerns as the judgement has res judicata effect on any future claims, less costly means of notification such as notification through publication are allowed. 82 In price-fixing cases, proof of aggregate damages through statistical or sampling methods is allowed, and proof of the exact amount is not strictly necessary. 83 Besides, The parens patriae mechanism, as foreseen by the federal law, does not only involve more lax procedural conditions, but also, courts and the State AGs were given considerable discretion in the distribution of damages.
In a large number of antitrust actions for treble damages, distribution of damages directly to the injured individuals becomes impossible or prohibitively costly. Particularly in the context of multi-state long-lasting violations identifying the individuals who were injured and distributing the damages directly to them may outweigh the amount of secured compensation. 97 Second, when the subject of violation is an item of relatively low value which is consumed regularly, the consumers may not always step forward to claim their share of damages either because the expected individual amount of compensation is relatively low or they have not kept any form of evidence such as receipts to prove that they belong to the injured group on whose behalf the compensation is secured. 98 As a result, if the method of direct distribution to individual consumers is followed, whole or part of the damage fund remains undistributed.
In cases where the problem of damage distribution arises, the courts and the In the context of parens patriae actions, when distribution of whole or part of the damage fund becomes impossible or prohibitively costly for any of the above reasons, the State AGs and the courts employ cy pres mechanisms to put the damage fund to the next possible use which benefits the consumers injured by the particular conspiracy indirectly. In such cases, generally the fund is allocated to private or public charities providing services to the injured consumer group with a purpose closely related to the subject matter of the particular conspiracy.
The milk antitrust investigation conducted by the State of New York best illustrates the functioning of cy pres mechanism in practice. 111 The subject matter of that case was a price-fixing conspiracy in the market for retail milk which was believed to last for approximately fourteen years in eleven different counties of New York. As a result of settlement negotiations, New York secured $6.1 million for compensation of the injured citizens. However, since milk is a product of a relatively low price which is consumed regularly, consumers were not expected to step forward to prove and claim damages.
Moreover, it was unfeasible for the State AG to identify all consumers affected by the price-fixing for the same reason. Whereas individual damage to each household was around $1.5 and to each resident $0.50, the Court calculated the cost of individual distribution as approximately $2.5 million, nearly half of the secured compensation. 112 Therefore, it was decided that the whole fund be distributed through cy pres mechanisms to the schools in the counties affected by the price-fixing to be used solely for nutrition purposes.
113
However, cy pres mechanisms are not equal in value to direct distribution, and therefore cannot be used as an escape from the complexities of damage distribution. 114 Considering the consumer redress rationale behind parens patriae actions, direct distribution still prevails where it is feasible. For instance, in a case involving price-fixing between automobile dealers, direct distribution was preferred since an average person keeps some kind of proof of the purchase of an automobile, and in such cases the individual amount of compensation was considered to be sufficient to give the consumers incentives to claim their share of the damage fund.
115
In another case involving price-fixing in the domestic air transportation market, direct distribution was preferred as every individual consumer was identifiable through the records of airline companies involved.
116
In summary, in each case a cost and benefit analysis is performed when deciding on the most effective method of damage distribution. Such analysis focuses on the expected individual benefit to the consumers who were injured by the particular conspiracy, and the cost of distribution method. In some cases it becomes necessary to create more innovative methods to provide 112 Id. 113 Id. 114 The courts approve cy pres methods as long as they prove to be "fair, reasonable and adequate" within the context of a particular case, see infra pp. best possible value for the consumers with the least possible cost. What is certain is that distribution of damages to a mass is a costly activity and it requires a high level specialisation. Arguably, it also involves a political decision regarding to the most effective method of damage distribution in each case. That seems to be the reason why the cy pres methods have been recognised in the field of parens patriae cases when their availability is still uncertain in class actions. In other words, as a political actor with accountability to the public, State AG has seemed both to Congress and the federal courts more likely to enshrine the benefit of citizen-consumers than private attorneys in such political decisions.
G. Settlements: Control by the Courts
As explained so far, parens patriae actions involve relatively lax procedural safeguards, and the State AGs possess considerable discretion in all phases of litigation, particularly so in determination of damages and the necessary injunctive remedies, since most cases end with settlements rather than final judgements. Those settlements are subject to the control of the federal courts. However, the control exercised by the federal courts appears to be rather limited, and therefore, the arguably political choices of the State AGs and the bargaining they have conducted against the plaintiff still proves to influence the outcome of the case to a large extent.
Although federal law requires approval of settlements in parens patriae
actions by federal courts, it is silent when it comes to the conditions which the courts should follow when approving such settlements. 117 As a solution, federal courts apply the conditions developed within the context of class actions by analogy when reviewing parens patriae settlements. 118 Those conditions require the settlements to be 'fair, reasonable, and adequate' in order to be approved by the courts.
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The condition of fairness focuses mainly on the negotiation process behind the settlement, and questions 'whether the settlement is resulted from good faith and arms-length bargaining between experienced counsel'. 120 In such analysis, the possibility of collusion between the parties is given key importance to prevent 'sweetheart deals' to the detriment of consumers. All of the elements considered by the courts in approval of settlements explained so far aim to protect the interests of consumers and prevent underenforcement as a result of collusion between the two sides of conflict. One should not be surprised by this, however, since these conditions have been imported from the context of class actions which involve strong principalagent problems. 124 The only factor which the courts take into consideration which could bar over-enforcement is 'the solvency of the defendants'. 125 In other words, so long as the defendants do not become bankrupted and as a result, the possibility of compensation to the consumers does not vanish 131 Id., at 492. 132 Id., at 493. 133 Id., at 494.
A decade later, in Illinois Brick, 134 the State of Illinois and local government entities sued brick manufacturers who stood two levels above them in the production chain for illegal overcharges caused by a price-fixing conspiracy.
Therefore, the Court faced the question whether plaintiffs should be allowed to claim the overcharge passed onto them through production chain using passing-on arguments offensively. The Court first reasoned that; 'whatever rule is to be adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants'. 135 In other words, if the plaintiff was granted the opportunity to invoke passing-on offensively to claim damages, the defendant should be able to rely on the same argument defensively to refuse the claims for damages. Thus, the Court had to make a political choice either to overrule Hanover Shoe or to close the door to private actions by indirect purchasers. Largely due to the potential danger of multiple recoveries, 136 the Court decided to choose the second alternative. According to the Court, if the first alternative was followed, federal courts would have to distribute the damages among all potential plaintiffs to prevent the danger of multiple recoveries, and the judicial mechanism could simply not shoulder such a burden:
'Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge -from direct purchasers to middleman to ultimate consumers.'
137
As most of the conspiracies generally occur among the manufacturers high above the final consumers in the production chain, the general belief was that as a result of Illinois Brick, private actions by final consumers and ultimately parens patriae mechanism would become entirely redundant. 138 Therefore, the response of the states to the judgment of the Supreme Court was rather 142 The data analysed in this section are based on the database of National Association of Attorneys General which is still under preparation. Therefore, the cases spotted so far by no means constitute the whole list of the actual cases initiated by the State Attorneys General. However, they still prove to be sufficient to depict the picture of parens patriae activity. 143 Oliff III, supra note 88, at 357. The product markets which those cases involve are equally diverse. Eight cases are related to drug or other healthcare markets, seven to basic consumer products such as CDs or milk, three to intermediary goods, four to electronics, one to automobiles, one to domestic air transportation, one to insurance services, and one to computer operating systems. When it comes to distribution of damages, cy pres methods seem to prevail.
Only in six cases were damages distributed solely through direct distribution methods. In seven cases direct and cy pres mechanisms were applied together, and in thirteen other cases damages were distributed entirely through cy pres mechanisms which is not surprising considering that most cases involved inter-state or nationwide enforcement efforts to address conspiracies in products of relatively low value and regular consumption such as drugs and basic consumer products. 
IV. TWO NOTORIOUS CASE EXAMPLES: Tobacco and Microsoft
Parens patriae activity by the State AGs had attracted only little attention until they reached the master settlement agreement with the tobacco companies in 1998. The degree of inter-state cooperation, the massive amount of recovery secured from the industry which had never successfully sued in the federal courts before, and the unprecedented application of the parens patriae doctrine compelled both the public and the legal community to consider what the states had been doing under the position of parens patriae. 144 Tobacco litigation was a tort case, and its subject matter was not antitrust. However, it is relevant to discuss here, albeit briefly, as its impacts went beyond its subject matter.
The master settlement agreement was reached as a result of 40 cases brought by 46 States to recover the cost the smokers had caused to their Medicaid systems. With the settlement agreement, the States together secured around $206 billion as compensation and the private lawyers they had hired received around $9 billion in attorney fees. 145 First of all, it was argued that employment of parens patriae in this case went far beyond the original purposes of the doctrine. The doctrine originally enshrines a sovereign's prerogative on the wellbeing of those living under his sovereignty.
In the tobacco case, however, smokers had not even been mentioned and what the States were in reality concerned about was how to recover their own costs. 146 As a result, what the companies were issued was not compensation, but a kind of a tax which the consumers would bear eventually. 147 Therefore, the State AGs were criticised heavily for using the parens patriae mechanism for the proprietary interests of the States and the benefit of their attorneys.
Besides, some provisions of the agreement argued to give competitive advantage to the settling companies against their current and future rivals. should not be allowed to pursue remedies independent of the federal authorities. 154 The court rejected this argument by making it clear that for the purposes of the federal courts it does not make any difference whether it is the federal authorities, State AGs or even private parties who seek remedies against violations of federal antitrust law. 155 As they are all authorised by federal law, their enforcement activities carry equal weight in the eyes of the federal courts. 156 The DOJ has filed an amicus brief against the arguments of Microsoft which interestingly depicts the enforcement environment which the DOJ desires. In its brief, the DOJ disagreed with Microsoft in principle, and defended the 149 state's involvement in the enforcement of federal antitrust policy. 157 However, it further argued that in cases of national scale, when the views of the states and the federal authorities collide, federal authorities should have the prerogative, and their suggestions should outweigh those of the states. 158 Arguably, this proposal of the DOJ illustrated that it desired a position for the federal authorities resembling that of the European Commission in antitrust enforcement. In other words, initiatives of the states were welcome as long as they contributed to the cases of the federal authorities, but at the end of the day it should be the federal authorities who would have the last word and give direction to the federal policy.
In the Microsoft case, the litigating States were led by California -the home of Silicon Valley -and almost all of the substantial competitors of Microsoft.
Therefore, although the remedies they sought were eventually rejected, and the federal courts approved the original settlement offered by the DOJ, 159 this case overshadowed the reputation of the State AGs in the field of antitrust. mechanism to solve such conflicts as neither authority is given superiority over the other. Ultimately, as a matter of principle, it is questioned whether it is appropriate to let the legal officers of the states get involved in the federal antitrust structure and bring their own view, particularly when nationwide markets are at stake.
As a result of its proceedings, the Antitrust Modernization Commission has decided to bring forward three alternatives to enhance the effectiveness of allocation of duties between the federal authorities and the State AGs. 168 The first alternative suggests restricting the parens patriae authority to strictly local matters. 169 The second alternative proposes restricting it to certain types of substantive issues. 170 The first alternative seems to ignore the dynamics of the parens patriae mechanism. As explained in detail above, 172 the rationale behind the recognition of parens patriae authority by the HSR Act was to create an additional mechanism for the enforcement of federal antitrust laws which performs two tasks at the same time; providing relief to consumers, and detecting conspiracies which escape the attention of the federal authorities.
This rationale represents a departure from the logic of the earlier American parens patriae doctrine which offered a peaceful way for states to protect their economic interests for the sake of federalism. Restricting parens patriae authority to local matters would mean a return to the traditional parens patriae doctrine which has little merit and justification at best, in a modern united country where the objective of federalism has already been achieved. This proposal is also inconsistent with the practical patterns of parens patriae other words, why would the victims of monopolization or retail price maintenance be denied the benefit of parens patriae, whereas the victims of price-fixing would not? Or thinking from the opposite angle, why could the conspirators involved in monopolization or retail price maintenance escape compensation through parens patriae actions whereas price-fixers could not?
In any case, the Commission should consider cautiously whether it is appropriate to cause a substantive inequality between the consumers and undertakings when trying to fix an enforcement problem.
The third alternative seems to be the most provocative as it proposes novel unequal positions for the enforcers of federal antitrust law. First of all, it is against any kind of legal principle one can think of, as it requires the permission of an administrative body for the exercise of the right to be heard before the judiciary. Furthermore, the degree of discretion that the federal authorities would enjoy in deciding whether to accept or to decline such requests is uncertain. In other words, would it be totally up to the perceptions of the federal authorities to bar state enforcement whenever it suits them or would such discretion be restricted to certain cases, e. In a very recent case moreover, the FTC decided to drop its investigation as its concerns were sufficiently addressed by the State AGs.
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The only notable exception to that trend seems to be the Microsoft case which dominated the discussions due to the scale and nature of the market and the undertakings involved. However, even in that case, there was no entire clash between the views of the States and the DOJ. Whereas nine of the State AGs cooperated with the DOJ vigorously, ten others decided to pursue more stringent remedies. Even if this case could be seen as a disturbing example, discrepancies can be prevented with less dramatic precautions than leaving the parens patriae mechanism totally redundant.
At this point, it appears inappropriate to leave the courts totally out of the agenda when discussing the effectiveness of federal antitrust enforcement.
There seems to be a consensus that the problem posed by the State AGs is one of over-enforcement. However, as explained above, due to the silence of federal law, the courts employ the standards developed within the context of class actions in parens patriae cases particularly when reviewing settlement agreements. 175 This analogy seems inappropriate, since the main danger within the context of class actions is one of under-enforcement. Hence, the problem of over-enforcement could very well be addressed through incorporation of a judicial review standard tailored to the dynamics of parens patriae actions into federal law. Conflicts between the federal authorities and the State AGs could also be given merit within the context of such a standard.
For instance, the State AGs could be compelled to bring forward extra evidence and economic arguments to convince the courts that the remedies imposed by the federal authorities fall short of addressing antitrust violations in any specific case and justify their actions. The courts could be given the authority to reject the actions by the State AGs on the basis that in a particular case, the concerns brought forward have already been sufficiently addressed and therefore, actions by the State AGs have been pre-empted.
In summary, opposition against the State AGs pools around the argument that, particularly in terms of the injunctive remedies they seek, the State AGs cause over-enforcement. However, considering the lack of empirical evidence on the actual costs imposed by state enforcement, the Modernization Commission should not rush to conclusion. The parens patriae mechanism has large potentials both as a source of redress to consumers and deterrence to business, and therefore, dramatic proposals setting this mechanism aside appear to be unfounded, particularly in the face of the constantly improving trend towards cooperation between the federal authorities and the State AGs.
Leaving the judiciary totally out of the discussion is another handicap, when the dangers of over-enforcement and inconsistency could easily be solved through adoption of a judicial review standard tailored to the dynamics of parens patriae cases.
B. Indirect Purchasers Rule
Another issue before the Modernization Commission, with probable impacts on enforcement efforts of the State AGs, is the position of indirect purchasers. 176 As explained above, under federal law, indirect purchasers cannot seek treble damages. 177 However, most of the state antitrust laws recognise the right of the indirect purchasers to obtain treble damages which the Supreme Court did not find unconstitutional. 178 As the data given in the empirical part indicate, the State AGs play an active role in providing compensation to the indirect purchasers through actions under state antitrust laws. 179 As a result, the danger of multiple recoveries which the Supreme Court aimed to avoid in Illinois Brick becomes exacerbated in practice, as the direct and indirect purchasers seek damages in different venues which render coordination between the courts to prevent multiple recoveries almost impossible. 180 In order to solve this dilemma, the Modernization Commission has correctly added the issue of indirect purchasers into its agenda.
The first alternative which the Modernization Commission proposes to solve the puzzle is to preempt the state rules providing standing to indirect purchasers. 181 If adopted, this alternative would prevent the indirect purchasers from bringing damage actions both in federal and state courts.
However, mainly due to considerations of federalism, this alternative is believed to be politically unfeasible and therefore the least likely to be realised. 182 The second alternative is to repeal the Illinois Brick rule and to preempt the state laws, so that all actions by both direct and indirect purchasers could be brought before the federal courts in order to prevent multiple recoveries and distribute damages between indirect and direct purchasers through a single action. 183 However, the political opposition to preemption still stands, and becomes even stronger under this second alternative. If Illinois Brick was repealed, there would be no conflict between the federal and state laws, and therefore no merit for pre-emption of state law.
The third alternative is to repeal Illinois Brick, not to preempt state law, and through amendment of federal procedural rules to require transfer of state cases to the federal courts under certain circumstances, so that damages could be distributed among the direct and indirect purchasers to prevent multiple recoveries. 184 Among three alternatives, the last seems to be the most likely to be adopted. Commission's current proposals seem inconsistent at best, as its proposals suggest restricting the parens patriae authority on the one hand, and levelling the playing field of the State AG in the context of indirect purchasers rule on the other.
CONCLUSIONS
The office of the State AG holds a unique position in the mainstream of state politics. Its main source of authority to enforce federal antitrust laws is the doctrine of parens patriae which experienced substantial transformation over time to become a mechanism of providing redress to consumers and deterrence against antitrust violations, whereas it was originally employed by the Supreme Court to solve conflicts of federalism. As foreseen by federal law, parens patriae mechanism gives the State AGs considerable discretion in every stage of enforcement, including the distribution of damages. As a result, parens patriae actions prove to be more advantageous than any other mechanism in providing relief to a mass. 
